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ABSTRACT* 
 
Central to the scientific debate about the ‘informal sector’ and the validity of the concept used to 
be a twofold challenge. The crux laid not only in the objective to explain the widely visible 
persistence of the informal economy in developing countries, but also in the identification of its 
roots and the proliferation conditions to be met ex ante. The present paper aims at establishing a 
link between the theories on informality and marginalization which is another important issue that 
has arisen within the discussions on the causes of persistent poverty a few years ago. Both concepts 
are interlinked and self-enforcing. On the macroeconomic level, any economy – be it formal or 
informal – consists of a set of different economic sectors and any of these sectors basically consists 
of an accumulation of people on the microeconomic level. Every time one looks at the macro level 
where political and economic conditions frame the dynamics of the formal and the informal 
economy, one has at the same time to look at the micro-level where the social and economic 
conditions determine the incentives for every actor to participate either in the formal, the informal 
or in both economies. Informality has multiple sources depending on whether the agent took a 
voluntary choice or had to involuntary opt-out from an institutional system. In this paper, the 
connection between informality and involuntary exclusion shall be examined in a retrospective of 
economic thought since the 1940s. The roots of the intertwined concepts of informality and 
economic exclusion have been laid in the dual economy theories of the 1940s-1950s. Recapitulating 
the works of Julius BOEKE, Arthur LEWIS, John HARRIS & Michael TODARO, Albert HIRSCHMAN 
and other socio-economists of that time, it will be argued that one of the necessary reasons for the 
persistence of the informal economy in developing countries is the dualism in institutional 
frameworks that leads to the marginalization of social groups and their subsequent exclusion from 
formal economic activities. By referring to the groundbreaking Africa studies of Keith HART (1971) 
and the INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION (1972), special emphasis will be given to the 
causal reciprocity between informality, marginalization and economic exclusion. The paper closes 
with a brief overview of current schools of thought that deal very differently with the issue of 
informality and economic exclusion. 
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 “One does not have to spend much time in developing countries 
to observe how their economies are a mish-mash, combining the productive 
with the unproductive, the First world with the Third.”  
          Dani RODRIK (2011), §1 
 
 
 
 
I. FRAMEWORK 
Central to the scientific debate about the ‘informal sector’ and the validity of the concept used 
to be a twofold challenge. The crux laid not only in the objective to explain the widely visible 
persistence of the informal economy in developing countries, but it laid also in the 
identification of its roots and the proliferation conditions to be met ex ante. Still, this paper 
shall not be perceived as just another review of how the sometimes controversially discussed 
concept of the ‘informal economy’ has evolved throughout the economics literature in the 
last decades.  
Addis Ababa, May 2014, the author‘s own photography 
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The present paper rather aims at establishing a link between the theories on informality and 
another issue that has arisen within the discussions on the causes of persistent poverty a few 
years ago, namely the issue of marginalization. HANAGAN (2008) defines marginality, or more 
specific, the fact of being marginalized, as a process where individuals are systematically 
“relegated to the side-lines of political debate, social negotiation and economic bargaining”. 
Both concepts, the informal economy and the marginalization of people, are interlinked and 
self-enforcing. In the context of informality it is therefore necessary to look at the 
macroeconomic conditions of markets and the microeconomic conditions of people at the 
same time. 
On the macroeconomic level, any economy – be it formal or informal – consists of a set of 
different economic sectors and any of these sectors basically consists of an accumulation of 
people – the economic actors – on the microeconomic level. Consequently, every time one 
looks at the macro level where political and economic conditions frame the dynamics of the 
formal and the informal economy, one has at the same time to look at the micro-level where 
the social and economic conditions determine the incentives for every actor to participate either 
in the formal, the informal or in both economies. If, on the one hand, specific businesses are 
executed outside the formal flows of resources, goods, services and capital, these individual 
informal actors are, on the other hand, marginalized and economically excluded. Informality 
therefore has multiple facetted aspects and basically arises out of two different sources 
depending on whether the agent took a voluntary choice or had to involuntary opt-out from an 
institutional system [CHEN (2012)].  
In this paper, the latter case, namely the connection between informality and involuntary 
exclusion shall be examined in a retrospective of economic thought since the 1940s. In the 
course of the present work, a twofold argument shall be developed whose structure is as 
follows. The first section “Roots of the intertwined issue” is dedicated to the dual economy 
theories of the 1940s-1950s where have been laid the roots of the intertwined concepts of 
informality and economic exclusion. Recapitulating the works of BOEKE (1953) and other 
socio-economists of that time, it will be argued that one of the necessary reasons for the 
persistence of the informal economy in least developed and developing countries is the dualism 
in institutional frameworks that leads to the marginalization of social groups and their 
subsequent exclusion from formal economic activities. The second section “Informality as an 
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issue of and for development” reviews the advent of the concept of informality in the scientific 
literature. By referring to the groundbreaking Africa studies of HART (1971) and the ILO 
(1972), special emphasis will be given to the causal reciprocity between informality, 
marginalization and economic exclusion. The third and last section “Recent findings and 
diverging approaches” eventually provides a brief overview of current classifications of the 
schools of thought that deal very differently and from distinctive starting points with the issue 
of informality and economic exclusion. 
 
II. ROOTS OF THE INTERTWINED ISSUE 
The vivid variety of informal employment and businesses that are common attributes to all 
least-developed and developing countries [henceforth: LDDCs]1 are usually subsumed and 
simplistically referred to as the ‘informal sector’. Yet, the term ‘sector’ is misleading when it 
comes to the heterogeneous cluster of existing informal activities that constitute the vibrant 
economic reality in most LDDCs. Small-scale and mostly family-owned businesses, where all 
kinds of products are sold in street shops, vendors’ trays and portable booths, dominate the 
picture of the urban areas in the less industrialized regions in the world. Although those 
countries which have the highest proportion of multi-dimensionally poor people2 differ 
markedly in their cultures and institutions, their informal economies and the people living 
therein share some basic commonalities. Being labor-intensive and equipped with a low level of 
technical support and mechanization, all these informal occupations fill multiple gaps in the 
satisfaction of basic needs and daily challenges: street doctors, moneylenders, vendors of 
                                              
1  Since there is still no commonly agreed definition of developing countries and thus no universally adopted terminology, 
 the author decided to combine the two most widely used terms by the World Bank and the United Nations. By merging 
 both terms, the author describes the ensemble of those countries worldwide (two third of all countries) that have the 
 lowest socioeconomic indicators compared to the other countries in the world – irrespective of whether they show small 
 or continuous progresses in some of the indicators of the socioeconomic panel (developing and emerging countries, as 
 defined by the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook 2014) or whether they continue to linger in a status quo 
 of poverty, human resource weakness and vulnerability (48 least developed countries, as defined by the United Nations 
 Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States). 
2  The global Multidimensional Poverty Index (henceforth: MPI) was created as an international measure of acute poverty. 
 Since 2010, the MPI has been included in the annual Human Development Reports of the United Nations Human 
 Development Program). Covering more than 100 developing countries, the index complements the widely used 
 traditional income-based poverty measures. Calculated out of 10 different weighted subindicators, the global MPI 
 captures various dimensions of individual deprivation such as education, health and living standards. If someone 
 is deprived in a third or more of ten subindicators, the MPI identifies them as multi-dimensionally poor. The extent or  
 intensity to which they are poor is thus measured by the number of deprivations these individuals experience. 
 Cf. Alkire et al. (2015)] 
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information and communication technologies, traders for car spare parts, garment producers, 
pottery-makers, open-air laundry tubs, smoking backyard fire-recycling facilities and garbage-
collectors. Although some of these businesses have immobile production sites or factories, they 
are still not bounded to a specific building. If necessary, for example in the case of a 
government intervention or the forced clearing of an informal city-quarter, these businesses 
could instantly and easily move within little time. However, most of the informal businesses 
actually are inherently mobile and easy-to-carry and as such neither fixed to a special place nor 
dependent on specific infrastructure. The dissociation from permanent factories and concrete-
built selling shops is characteristic for any kind of informal production and service provision.  
Moreover, all of the informal economies worldwide are highly segmented with respect to their 
various economic sectors, the workplaces as well as the ethnicity and gender of their workforce. 
Although they comprise hybrid forms of unregistered work, criminal activities and tax evasion, 
the informal economy per se also provides multiple types of easy-to-hire employment and often 
represents the last resort (or the only possibility ever known) in terms of rudimentary social 
insurance for those who lack legal and social protection [CHEN (2012)]. Apart from the 
questions related to the emergence of informal economic structures, development economists 
around the world are even more concerned when it comes to the role of the informal economy 
for the development process of a country and its overall economic growth. For most of the 
researchers dealing with informality, there are direct linkages to persistent poverty [CHEN ET 
AL. (2005), SAMAL (2008)], for others [e.g. DE SOTO (1989, 2000)] informality is directly linked 
to economic exclusion.  
To understand the issue of informality within its retrospective context among the 
various economic theories of stagnation, growth and welfare, one has to return to the 
beginnings of development and the so-called ‘modernization’ theory. According to 
ROSTOW (1956, 1960), development per se follows a path of five stages. It begins in the first 
stage with the traditional society. In the second stage the preconditions for take-off are 
developed and growth sets in i.e. the socio-political institutions change and cultural values 
slowly adapt to the changing economic system. The third phase is then the so-called take-off 
phase where the “old blocks and resistances to steady growth are finally overcome”3. The 
traditional society finally transcends to the stage of industrialization with the emergence and 
                                              
3   Rostow, W. (1960), “The Take-Off“, (1990: p. 7) 
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expansion of leading industrial sectors, a high rate of investment and deep structural changes in 
infrastructure and economic policy; these developments represent the basis for the fourth 
phase. During the latter, modern technology spreads throughout the economy and the system 
experiences sustained but fluctuating progress. This drive to maturity then culminates in the 
fifth and last stage of modernization where the economy develops the capacity to efficiently 
adopt the most advanced technology in its production processes and thereby to expand its 
product matrix.  
ROSTOW (1960) concluded that societies having attained this very last stage in the 20th century 
showed two attributes4. First, real income per capita rose to an extent where it exceeded the 
coverage of basic needs like food, clothing and shelter. And second, drawing from CLARK 
(1940) and FOURASTIÉ (1949), the structure of the workforce changed so that as the share of 
the primary sector in the provision of employment declined tremendously. Right after its 
publication, ROSTOW’s stages-theory was criticized for the inherent assumption of stringent 
linearity in the development process of a country. Amongst others, GRIMM (1979), ITAGAKI 
(1963), KUZNETS (1965) blamed ROSTOW for not explaining how economies could move from 
one stage to the next and for not detailing the necessary and sufficient conditions to be satisfied 
for a country to be able to attain a specific stage. Although unsatisfactory on the point of 
empirical evidence, ROSTOW’s descriptive generalizations nonetheless found application in the 
American programs of development aid of the 1960s and the early 1970s [ENGERMAN (2003)]. 
With the categorization of LDDCs according to their attained stages of capitalist development, 
ROSTOW’s theory of modernization became part of the development ideology of the Western 
world. Especially during his service time for the Kennedy5- and the Johnson-administration in 
the United States, ROSTOW’s work represented a form of guiding map that chanelled foreign 
direct investments into developing countries. The aim of these policies was to launch the poor 
countries’ “take-off into sustained growth” of the capitalist type [LATHAM (1998)] and to help 
them to move forward into a more advanced stage on the rostowian ladder of development.   
                                              
4  In the third edition of his book The stages of economic growth, Rostow emphasized the existence of a sixth stage, 
 namely post-maturity. In this stage, especially western societies chose to allocate more resources to social welfare 
 and social-security nets, and resources were increasingly directed to the provision of services on a mass basis. 
 Cf. Ibid. (1990), p. 11 
5  Cf. Brauer, C. (1982): ”Kennedy, Johnson and the War on Poverty“, The Journal of American History, Vol. 69, No. 1, 
 pp. 98-119, Organization of American Historians. 
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To ROSTOW, the process of development was a linear and irreversible transition into only one 
possible direction. Based on this framework, he argued that the industrialized states of today 
had pursued a traverse-process where they went through the various stages of development one 
after the other over a period of several decades since the take-off of the Industrial Revolution 
[ROSTOW (1956)]. The so-called underdeveloped countries, however, got stuck somewhere 
along the way of modernization. They had left the first stage of the traditional society, but had 
not yet attained the critical stage where capital accumulates through the mobilization of private 
and public savings, investments expand industrial capacity and new techniques spread in the 
modern and the agricultural sector. In the rostowian framework of modernization, production 
structurally changes from labor-intensive to capital-intensive techniques when the modern 
sector expands and the traditional sector starts to shrink in terms of their shares in the 
production of overall national income. Applying ROSTOW’s theory to the LDDCs of the 20th 
and 21st century however reveals that their process of development and structural change does 
not fit the theory of stages. If one nonetheless sticks to the framework, one has to argue that 
the LDDCs had experienced, and some of them still do face, two or more of the rostowian 
stages at the same time.  
In his works, ROSTOW neglected the possibility of social dualism in the sense of a temporal 
coalescence of two stages of development. Nevertheless, numerous of Rostow’s scientific 
contemporaries emphasized the existence of a social and economic dualism in the 
underdeveloped parts of the world. What the LDDCs experienced was different from the usual 
pattern of structural change where the industrial sector increases to the detriment of a 
decreasing agricultural sector. Most of these countries had a century-long colonial heritage and 
had gained their independence only in the mid-1940s and 1950s. Their socioeconomic systems 
had been coined by their colonial rulers and as such also their economic structures with 
infrastructure networks, production facilities and the degree of technology penetration. These 
inherited institutions also determined how equally the benefits of these structures were shared 
among the indigenous population and the colonists i.e. and how much trickled down through 
the social classes. 
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III. THE THEORIES OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DUALISM 
The idea of a dualistic development that splits society into participating agents and non-
participating agents – those who are left-behind by economic progress – stems from the Dual 
Economy theories of the 1940s [KANBUR (2013)]. Their commonly acknowledged theoretical 
founder was Dutch sociologist and economist Dr. Julius BOEKE ({1942, 1946} 19536). 
Although not well known in the economics community nowadays, BOEKE’s extensive research 
and detailed descriptions of the colonial society in the Dutch East Indies between 1910-1929 
have delivered two essential insights which are still valid today: i) institutions differ across 
cultures and cannot easily be implemented elsewhere in a top-down manner, and ii) if a specific 
institutional framework is imposed onto another culture, the framework will only be partially 
adopted by the respective population; the inborn institutions will continue to prevail i.e. they 
remain valid for some parts of the population. This dualism of prevailing institutions then leads 
to divergent economic subsystems within society. With these important conclusions, Boeke had 
laid the foundations for numerous succeeding publications on the theory of social and 
economic duality such as(in chronological order) ROSENSTEIN-RODAN (1943), NURKSE (1953), 
LEWIS (1954, 1956), ORNATI (1955), HIGGINS (1956), HIRSCHMAN (1957, 1958), JORGENSON 
(1961), RANIS & FEI (1961), GEERTZ (1963), DIXIT (1970), HARRIS & TODARO (1970) and  
SINGER (1970).  
Although BOEKE’s name rarely appears in the literature today, his ideas have at least been 
implicitly rediscovered in the economics literature. In the Biografisch Woordenboek van Nederland7 
JAQUET (1979) shortly describes the life and works of this often forgotten economist who 
actually had so much implicit influence on the research of the informal sector as well as on 
institutions and their role for development. Born in 1884 into a Baptist priest family, BOEKE 
later studied literature science and political science in Amsterdam. In his doctoral thesis on the 
critical evaluation of the tropical colonial political economy (Tropisch-koloniale 
staathuishoudkunde: het problem), BOEKE rejected the applicability of the western economic 
and political institutions onto the East-Indian societies. He highlighted the need for a distinct 
economic science for the Dutch-Indonesian colonies where the indigenous population 
                                              
6  Boeke had revised and expanded his two earlier studies The Structure of the Netherlands Indian Economy (1942) and The 
 Evolution of the Netherlands Indies Economy (1946) in order to publish them conjointly in his Opus Summum Economics and 
 Economic Policy of Dual Societies as exemplified by Indonesia in 1953. 
7  The Biografisch Woordenboek van Nederland is a Dutch biographical dictionary consisting of 6 volumes which were 
 published between 1979 and 2009. The dictionary contains short biographies of well-known or notable Dutch people. 
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responded otherwise than expected to the economic incentives set by the western colonial 
institutions. Shortly after the publication of his doctoral thesis in 1910, BOEKE left the 
Netherlands to work as civil servant and teacher for politics and political economy at the 
Gymnasium William III in Batavia. In 1914 he became advisor for the Volskreditwezen; an 
institution that was founded as part of the Dutch imperialistic policies in to improve the living 
situation of the indigenous population through target programs in education, health care and 
rural credit cooperatives. Throughout his time in Indonesia, BOEKE continued to do research 
on the social and economic living conditions of the Indonesian population. After a renewed 
call, BOEKE finally accepted the chair of tropical-colonial political economy (later: eastern 
economy) at Leiden University. In 1929 he returns to the Netherlands to work as a professor of 
eastern Economics with lectures on the “Dualistic Economy”. Later, BOEKE’s human and 
scientific integrity brought him into severe conflict with the German occupiers under the NS-
Regime in the Netherlands from 1940 to 1945. At his own risk and own expenses, BOEKE 
published the brochure Nationaalsocialistische Staathuishoudkunde in 1941 where he heavily 
criticized and opposed the Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging, the Dutch political party which 
collaborated with the German occupiers. As a consequence, BOEKE was interned in the 
concentration camp Buchenwald from October 1941 until September 1944 – a detention which 
he survived. In the postwar period, BOEKE worked again in Indonesia but had to resign and to 
return to the Netherlands in September 1955 due to the late sequelae of a car accident; soon 
after his retirement followed his death in January 1956.  
Three years before his death, his opus summum, the Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies 
– As exemplified by Indonesia was published in 1953. It contained BOEKE’S collected observations 
of his time in Indonesia. The emphasis throughout his works had always been on the baseline 
argument that every attempt to directly apply western economic doctrines and theories in the 
less industrialized societies was inevitably doomed to fail. BOEKE emphasized that the apparent 
contradiction between the western and eastern systems necessitated a distinct economic policy 
approach taking also into account the issue of “Societal Dualism”. He did not limit the 
definition of dualism to a specific dimension but continually emphasized its validity for all 
spheres of life and its multifaceted aspects: “it finds expression in other departments of life 
besides the economic – in legislation and government, in law and judicature, in social 
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organization, but also in men’s conception of what they need, in their evaluation of things, in 
work and recreation, in religion and morals”.8  
Basically, BOEKE (1953) reasoned that the implementation of western capitalism in East-Asian 
pre-capitalist countries in the course of 19th century colonization had led to a continuous 
disintegration of societal structures in the respective colonies. The consequence was a persistent 
incongruence between the imposed socio-economic settings of the western world and the 
originally prevailing social and economic environment in Dutch Indonesia. In his work,  
BOEKE generalized9 the perceived Indonesian-European incongruence for other tropical Asian 
territories where European colonizers had implemented western political and economic 
systems in eastern aboriginal societies. The Dutch-Indies thereby served as prime example of 
underdevelopment because BOEKE typified their economic problems for the ensemble of all 
the countries in the world that had experienced decades of colonial policy imposed by the 
“West”: “The economic problems of Indonesia are typical for a large and important part of the 
world, that, therefore, an analysis of these problems may […] serve as a guide to the host of 
inexperienced planners for the well-being of that part of the world which has not yet 
conformed to their western ideals”.10 
In BOEKE’s work, the West referred to the industrialized European and North American 
countries of the 1940-1950s. The latter were in a state of high-capitalism with a “multiplicity of 
organizations”, i.e. they had huge industrial sectors with a multitude of small and big 
competitive companies, which inevitably entailed an increasing division of labor and an 
economic leitmotif of efficiency. BOEKE regarded corporate enterprises as the pillars of 
commercial exchanges. Mechanized industries with mass production and country-wide 
transportation networks nourished the unlimited wants of the households. In contrast to the 
western principles, BOEKE defined and described the eastern society to be based on 
communitarianism and organically determined social ties. No sharp distinction existed between 
economic and non-economic motives as the joint-family was engaged in self-provision; the kin 
parallelly constituted the basic unit of production as well as of consumption. This intimate 
                                              
8  Boeke, J. (1953), pp. 8 & 14 
9  Boeke’s generalization of his Dutch-Indonesian impressions to other colonial and developing economies was subject 
 to diverse criticism. Central to the critique were the obvious discrepancies between Boeke’s portrayal of the Indonesian 
 economic structure and the respective descriptions of other researchers. Cf. Higgins (1956), Breman (1976a-b, 1998), 
 Grimm (1979) and Datta (1981).  
10  Boeke, J. (1953), foreword 
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commingling of survival and commercial aspects was submitted to the informal institutional 
framework of culture and tradition that dominated the precapitalistic society. The focus was put 
on the production of goods; commodity-driven commercial exchanges were complementary 
and remained somehow outside the daily struggle for survival. For BOEKE, the basic difference 
between the western and eastern systems therefore laid in the difference of the specific role of 
the individual for society. Production in the non-interdependent local units was based on a 
weak division of labor and was not influenced by prices and markets but by the needs of the 
kin: “Not exchange but rather self-maintenance is the basis of existence; individual self-
sufficiency is the dominant idea, the unit being the family”11. Low geographic capital such as 
underdeveloped transportation networks, lacking infrastructure and region-wide lacking access 
to electricity and potable water amplified the impact of geographical isolation to the detriment 
of united interregional markets. The geographically bounded local markets constituted distinct 
economic spheres and thus led to a scattered national economy of independent markets. As the 
societies’ needs mainly depended on the families’ ability to produce, economic exchange 
generally occurred within the limits of these local markets. Based on his observations BOEKE 
concluded that the eastern economic order substantially differed from the intertwined capitalist 
principals of western capitalism because the same economic motive that drove western 
commerce appeared to be naturally absent in the East.  
As another crucial difference between the western and native types of production, BOEKE 
mentioned the so-called ‘business concerns’ which lay on different foundations. The western 
agents and production units relied on capital and were thus able to sustain capacity 
enlargements as well as shocks of diminishing revenue or even the necessity of down-sizing in 
times of shrinking demand and economic recessions. On the other side, the native industries 
were much less capital intensive and were based on the use of unpaid family labor; the only 
response to economic shocks therefore could be to off-set parts of the labor force. But as most 
of the employed laborers were usually family members that depended on the joint-output, the 
offsetting revealed to be difficult or just socially impossible. While the western industries were 
directly linked to the world market, the local small businesses were excluded from interregional 
or international commerce and had to rely on the local markets and their local chain of 
suppliers, middlemen and traders. As a consequence, the contact between these two inherently 
                                              
11  Boeke, J. (1953), p. 40f 
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different social stages of commerce – i.e. the internationally included capitalistic society and the 
locally constrained precapitalistic one – generated endemic difficulties. The latter culminated in 
intra-societal divergence which, according to BOEKE, represented the prerequisite element of 
societal dualism: the antithesis between two different full-grown economic systems that 
simultaneously expand and sometimes cooperate but also diverge in terms of their underlying 
institutions. Generalized to the ensemble of the LDDCs there might thus be coalescence 
between international markets and a village economy as well as between an urban and a rural 
societal system – the dominant one of which revealed to be the imported western economic 
structure that did not totally absorb the naturally grown social system. Neither of the systems 
became generalized for the whole society. BOEKE’s theory of economic dualism was thus based 
on strictly separated forms of systems but also tried to grasp the interdependence and 
interrelations among them that actually breaded the conflicts. He did not deploy on the 
dichotomy of the capitalistic and non- or precapitalistic sector but insisted on the fact that the 
dichotomy was non-material and rather concerned incongruent philosophies of life.  
Basically, BOEKE classified societies according to their economic systems, their technology and 
their dominating form of social organization. However, no society passes discretely from one 
system into the other; usually there always is a certain overlapping of various social systems 
through time. Thus, the assumption of homogeneous full grown social styles was often 
criticized to be unrealistic as only very few countries in the world show perfectly elaborated and 
pure social styles; instead their dominating social system may combine different dominant 
characteristics in a blending of overlapping styles: the “prevailing social system, the remains of 
the preceding and the beginnings of [the] future social style”12.  
Over the 15 years of BOEKE’s observation from 1914 to 1929, the Dutch Indies experienced 
stagnant incomes per capita [BOEKE (1953), THE MADDISON-PROJECT (2013)13] because the 
high population growth was not compensated by a respective growth of economic production. 
This was mainly due to lacking increases in capital accumulation and industrial productivity. 
BOEKE concluded that the eastern societies were static economies in opposition to the western 
societies with dynamic economic growth paths. HIGGINS (1956) blamed BOEKE for 
concentrating on a dichotomy of statics versus dynamism when describing the East-West 
                                              
12  Boeke, J. (1953), p. 3f 
13  Cf. Bolt, J. & J. van Zanden (2014) 
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contrast. Basically, HIGGINS assumed the business decisions of the entrepreneur to be the 
engine of western growth paths while the eastern economies with their production inputs 
(natural resources, labor and capital) did not rely on innovation and continuous structural 
change: “Such economies bear little resemblance to the theoretical abstraction known as a 
‘static’ economy, and an economy which is not growing is still a special case of economic 
dynamics”.14 However, BOEKE asserted himself that the term “static” when being applied to 
the eastern societies should not describe absence of growth or unaltering production matrixes. 
In the aim to preserve the traditional patterns of the economy and averting any disturbing 
element for the communitarian institutions, the issue of stationarity was linked to informal 
institutions and “based on tradition, aiming at rest, beset with impeding factors and hence 
lacking in suppleness, and relegating economy to a secondary, subordinate position”.15 The 
staticity was thus to be equalized with economic exclusion – be it voluntary or involuntary – 
from societal change. 
In his explanations for the prevailing social dualism, BOEKE explicitly referred to the role of 
predominant informal institutions16 in the Dutch Indies such as the social values, culture and 
the individual attitude towards one’s own contribution to the welfare of society. He 
hypothesized an underlying social tenor of fatalism and resignation towards the creation of 
output beyond the satisfaction of the population’s subsistence needs. An increase in wages in 
the traditionalist sector would thus have an insignificant effect on the incentive structure of the 
workers and even lead to an actual decrease in the supply of labor. HIGGINS (1956) joined this 
argumentation and described the traditional informal institutions as persistence of a “feudal 
attitude towards commerce and industry” which led to individual unwillingness towards 
product advances. This inherent tenor also constrained entrepreneurial spirit and appetite for 
uncertain investments. But “development of the capitalist type cannot take place without 
capitalists” as the latter enable inventors to eventually come up with a more efficient allocation 
of resources and inputs and thus, economic growth.17 For HIGGINS, the situation of the 
LDDCs and the therein observed slow shift in the labor force and the heterogeneous structural 
                                              
14  Higgins, B. (1956), p. 108 
15  Boeke, J. (1953), p. 29 
16  The distinction between formal and informal institutions was mainly coined by the works of Douglass North (1990). In 
 1993, the latter was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences together with Robert Fogel “for having 
 renewed research in economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to explain economic and institutional 
 change“. Cf. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1993/presentation-speech.html 
17  Higgins, B. (1956), p. 111 
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change from the traditional to more industrialized sectors were due to society-inherent rigidities 
with respect to the adoption of new technologies and institutions. HIGGINS and BOEKE 
concluded that therefrom have arisen those hybrid forms of business units and transaction 
processes which could be observed in LDDCs all over the world in the 1950s. This very 
conclusion is still valid for the informal economy concept today.  
Already at the time of his publications, the works of Boeke on social dualism had inspired many 
other contemporary economists. For example MOORE (1953) considered the mode of 
employment to be the central criteria of distinction within these dualistic economic structures. 
For MOORE, there was a sectoral identification problem because one had to differentiate 
between the inactive share of the population and those being economically active or 
productive, i.e. those entitled by a regular occupation and having the status of an employer, 
employee, self-employed or unpaid family worker. However, MOORE was well aware of the 
fundamental difficulty to define what was ‘economic’ and thus ‘economically active’. This 
reasoning joined the argumentation of BOEKE that eastern communitarian societies were 
characterized by a division of labor with respect to age, sex and intra-kinship obligations. The 
adoption of capitalist principles entailed a necessary reorganization of production structures 
and thus an increase in specialization and the division of labor. Both consequences were 
incongruent with the traditional structures of the eastern kins.  
Another contemporary of BOEKE was ORNATI (1955) who did a study on the nature and 
problems of industrial labor in India. He emphasized the contrast between the East and the 
West in terms of differences in the prevalent forms of employment and the prevailing informal 
institutions with respect to the latter. To ORNATI, the term labor force revealed to be 
inappropriate to describe the level of economic activity or the ratio between tapped and 
untapped economic potential of an underdeveloped country. In 1948, the so-called Factories Act 
had been passed in India. This law aimed at the regulation of the employment conditions in 
Indian factories, mines and the communications industry. Based on the application or 
consecutive violation of these formal employment regulations, ORNATI divided the labor 
market into two categories i.e. the organized and the unorganized sector. Yet, the majority of 
the Indian workers were not employed in these industries but in agricultural plantations, trade 
services or in the uncountable small manufacturing enterprises producing basic consumption 
commodities – in short, all the other occupations which were outside the rule of the Factories 
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Act and thus part of the unorganized sector. In this respect, ORNATI also highlighted the 
infeasibility of targeted policies which was due to the critical lack of statistical information on 
the number of ‘unorganized’ laborers, their presumably difficult or even miserable working 
conditions and their earnings. The aforementioned informal institutions also played a vital role 
when ORNATI described the very pronounced dislike for factory work of the Indian workers. 
The Indian informal institutions and attitudes apparently did not comply with the westernized 
working conditions and especially the strict regulations and timing in the industrial sector: 
“Occasionally, the worker leaves the factory not to return to the village but to rebel against 
being forced into what might be called the ‘factory norms’: time discipline, the limitation on 
leisure, the confines of the machines, the toil of learning, and the like”18. In 1947, the issue of 
strong ties to the rural birthplaces and the inner pressure to return (even though no job 
opportunity or other stake in the village economy may lie ahead), was officially labelled as 
Village Nexus19 by the Indian Government: “The worker stays in the factory until illness, 
nostalgia, boredom, or unemployment drives him back to the village where he stays for a week 
or a month until the need to earn a living returns him to the city for employment”20. 
As already elaborated previously, the daily reality of how the poor eastern masses worked and 
traded was incongruent with the western capitalistic principals. The imposed institutional 
settings responded to the requirements of a capitalistic system with individual economic agents 
rather than kinship communities. Due to the seemingly incongruent economic institutions and 
habits, BOEKE was convinced that the majority of the eastern population was and, if the 
institutional status quo was to stay unaltered, would remain unable to adopt the western 
capitalistic structures. Some of BOEKE’s contemporaries were also critical towards the concept 
of social dualism. They emphasized the lack of a sound baseline model and regarded his theory 
to consist of nothing more than a detailed and sometimes even inconsistent description of the 
social conditions in the Dutch Indies from the 1910-1920s. HIGGINS (1956) subsumed that, 
because the eastern society was totally different from the European social order, BOEKE 
precipitately drew the fatalist conclusion that “economic and social development on western 
lines is impossible for the East” and did not focus on the issue that some existing eastern 
“social and cultural institutions […may actually be] constituting a barrier to economic 
                                              
18  Ornati, O (1955), p. 46f 
19  Government of India (1946): Main Report 1947 of the Labour Investigation Committee, cited in Ornati (1955), p. 46 
20  Ornati, O (1955), p. 46f 
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development” as they obstructed the adoption of western economic principles.21 In response to 
BOEKE’s deficiencies on the institutional question, HIGGINS (1956) described various 
sociological barriers to economic development. Amongst them, he highlighted the organization 
of society around the kinship ties which may represent a disincentive for the individuals to 
supply more labor, save more or incur higher investment risks. The economic outcome of any 
individual engagement would always positively or negatively affect the kin as a whole, 
because the joint-family represented the basic unit of production and consumption in the 
eastern society.  
The steady intrusion of western structures into a precapitalistic country in terms of capital, 
technology, organization and institutions created a gradual and continuing shift in the balance 
between the native production system and the western style supply chain. As for the case of the 
Dutch Indies, the handicraft methods’ share in overall production shrank as the traditional 
producers became intermediate suppliers to the nascent industries in the urban centers. 
Although capitalist structures connected and intermingled with the traditional sector, the 
population groups in the rural areas were disconnected from the capitalist enclaves in the urban 
areas whose structural and institutional “boundaries […] constantly become more clearly 
defined and more unsurmountable”.22 Thus, already BOEKE described the issue of 
marginalization and subsequent economic exclusion of the rural population.  
Structural change per se implies not only the emergence of (temporary) dualism, but also the 
aggravation of inequality among the population depending on who is engaged in which 
economic sector i.e. in the traditional or in the emerging capitalist sector. For Dutch-Indonesia 
BOEKE concluded that the elite aligned its efforts and objectives with the promising western 
power. The cultural and monetary inflows that accompanied the instauration of western 
capitalism diverted their devotion (irrespective of whether the elite was part of an extractive or 
inclusive i.e. private property based institutional framework) from their own society towards the 
new economic lodestar23. For ROSTOW (1956, 1960) economic progress arises out of a stimulus 
                                              
21  Higgins, B. (1956), p. 111 
22  Boeke, J. (1953), p. 215 
23  In this respect, Boeke points out to the misuse of political de jure and de facto power to design institutional settings that 
 benefit a specific clientele such as the political elite of a country. This issue had been further elaborated decades later in 
 the field of institutional economics by, amongst others, North & Weingast (1989), North (1990), North et al. (2009) and 
 was later subsumed under the term “extractive institutions” which was coined by Acemoglu et al. (2005, 2009, 2014). Yet, 
 the latter think of a different direction in the link of causation of political reorientation, as they assume that the political 
 institutions at time t influence the economic institutions at time t. The latter in turn determine the distribution of 
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that incites a change in the balance of powers, the social values character of the prevailing 
economic institutions. Such a stimulus – may it be a political revolution or a technical 
innovation – alters the propensities of individuals and thus spurs the economic initiative of 
specific social groups, e.g. the social élite, while the rest of society remains in the status quo: 
“More often than not the economic motives for seeking economic progress converge with 
some non-economic motive, such as the desire for increased social power and prestige,  
national pride, political ambition and so on”24. This reasoning was also later shared by  
BREMAN (1976a-b)25: “In country after country, those in control of the instruments of 
economic power have consistently perverted one of the essential purposes of government – to 
redress the major imbalances in the society – by using the power of public office to further 
entrench their privileged position”26. However, the mobility to switch from one sector to the 
other and thus the respective opportunity set was limited by the individual’s social standing and 
the institutions that individual adhered to and was subjected to. Based on BREMAN’s 
explanations one can argue that with the exception of the eastern ruling elites that had quickly 
aligned with the colonizers and adopted the new system, the majority of the population became 
increasingly marginalized. With the expansion of western capitalist structures and the nascent 
but steadily growing exports-producing agricultural industries, the traditional businesses became 
increasingly economically excluded. As a consequence, the social dualism eventually manifested 
itself on the microeconomic level in terms of diverging individual opportunity sets between the 
ruling élite and the rest of the population. The latter became more and more constrained in 
their selectable options. For BOEKE, this deprivation of the trickle-down elements of capitalism 
(i.e. the fruits of trade created through the increased dovetailing with international commerce) 
annihilated the “dynamic, developing element in the [eastern] culture”27, a loss that inevitably 
led to economic stagnation for the majority of the population.  
To sum up: throughout his research, BOEKE defined the ‘West’ and the ‘East’ as two discrete 
socio-economic systems that were embedded in their very own specific institutional 
                                                                                                                                                      
 resources among the population at time t and thus, the future economic performance of the economy as a whole. 
 Cf. Acemoglu et al. (2005), p. 390. 
24  Rostow, W. (1956), p. 27 
25  Breman, J. (1976a), p. 1875 
 He also provides a vague path towards a solution for the issue of exclusion through the gain of access to formal 
 schooling. Cf. Breman, J. (1976b), p. 1906  
26  Friedman & Sullivan (1974), p. 406, as quoted in Breman, J. (1976a), p. 1875 
27  Ibid. p. 39 
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frameworks with their distinctive culture and philosophy of life. The socio-economic settings in 
the western world diverged from the social and economic environment in the tropical Asian 
territories in such a way as both systems were ruled by very distinctive institutional orders. The 
same socio-economic doctrines that were applied in the western societies, were only partially 
valid or not at all congruent to the eastern institutional systems: “When one distinguishes all 
these peoples according to their degrees of culture and their political situation, one perceives 
that every group moves in its own economic order and that every theoretic system has to rest 
upon its own economic order to be usable for a given nation”.28  
The recognition of the existence of these fundamental institutional differences between the 
western and eastern way of doing things was crucial. Nonetheless, it took several years since 
BOEKE’s first publication in 1942 until these insights found their corresponding echo in the 
economics literature. Although his name was rarely explicitly mentioned in the aftermath, 
BOEKE’s findings, and especially the debates they initiated, paved the way for the later research 
on institutions and their role for development as elaborated in i.a. (in chronological order) 
ENGERMAN & SOKOLOFF (1994), LIN & NUGENT (1995), MATTHEWS (1986), NABLI & 
NUGENT (1989), NORTH (1990), NORTH & WEINGAST (1989), PLATTEAU (1994a,b), STIGLITZ 
(1986), WEINGAST (1995) and later in ACEMOGLU ET AL. (2002, 2005), EASTERLY (2002), 
EASTERLY ET AL. (2006), LA PORTA & SHLEIFER (2008), LEVY (2008), ORDÓÑEZ (2010), RAY 
(1998), SCHNEIDER (2012), SCHNEIDER & ENSTE (2002), SOKOLOFF & ENGERMAN (2000), 
WILLIAMSON (2009) and GUHA-KHASNOBIS ET AL. (2007).  
BOEKE’s theory of social dualism represented the theoretical background for various research 
projects in the 1970s on the advent and persistence of the informal economy in LDDCs. As 
different as the latter are with respect to their culture and history, they nevertheless share a 
common past as former colonies. Most of the LDDCs in Africa and South East Asia had 
inherited institutional dualism from their former colonial rulers and remained unable to resolve 
it – even after gaining independence in the 1940s and 1950s. Challenged by massive migration 
waves from the rural areas to the expanding cities, the prevailing institutional heterogeneity 
reinforced the marginalization of social groups and thus their economic exclusion from formal 
markets [HART (1973)]. 
                                              
28  Quote of an unknown Indian author, quoted in: Boeke, J. (1953), p. 8 
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 Informality and engagement in the shadow economies became common attributes of the 
steadily growing cities in all developing and transitioning countries. 
 
IV. INFORMALITY AS AN ISSUE OF DEVELOPMENT 
Migration played a central role in the development models of the dualism economists of the 
1950-1960s. LEWIS (1954, 1956), who is generally considered to be the founder of the 
mathematical dualism models, was convinced that the basis of the development process lay in 
the flows of resources, i.e. labor, capital and goods, between the industrialized and the 
traditional agricultural sector. In theory, already small technological advances set off surplus 
labor in the structurally changing agricultural sector and improved health care induces further 
population growth. The rural excess labor flows to the urban areas where the industrial sector 
expands. The latter is assumed to produce the machines that will even more increase 
productivity in the agricultural sector and thus offset more surplus labor to be re-employed in 
the industrial plants. A parallel flow of increasing agricultural food surplus will in turn nurture 
the industrial workers and thus, increase their productivity. This synergy of economic flows 
between various sectors of production was also central to the discussion of the displacing and 
compensating employment effects of new technologies. These enduring controversies had been 
initiated by RICARDO’s (1821, 3rd edit.) book chapter On Machinery and had inspired a new 
strand of literature focusing on the issue of the Traverse Process29 from structural change. 
Especially the ‘horizontal’30 growth models such as the one from LEWIS (1954) emphasized the 
sectoral interdependencies that occurred within an economy and modelled the intersectoral 
flows of production factors. In the Lewis-model, a two-sector economy with a modern and a 
subsistence sector is assumed. While the modern sector uses reproducible capital whose 
product can be sold above wage-costs, the subsistence sector does not. Output in the latter is 
lower than in the industrialized sector because productivity is not “fructified by capital” and 
thus remains “unproductive”31 i.e. below its hypothetical potential.  
                                              
29  Hagemann, H & R. Scazzieri (2009), pp. 143-147 
30  There are basically two different kinds of formal representations in the history of economic thought where the 
 implications of structural change were modelled: i) the vertical models from i.a. Lowe (1976) and the ‘later’ Hicks (1973), 
 and ii) the horizontal models from i.a. Lewis (1954, 1956) and the ‘early’ Hicks (1965). 
31  Lewis, A. (1954), p. 407f 
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LEWIS saw the central problem in the theory of economic development in the understanding of 
how capital accumulation (including physical capital as well as knowledge and skills) was 
triggered. He tried to understand the institutional and the structural change that incited the 
ruling ten percent of a preindustrial country to save more than the rest of society i.e. the 
process by which a community with low saving rates converts itself into a growing economy 
where voluntary saving increases to more than twelve percent of national income. For  
[LEWIS (1968)] the crux was the limited financial capacity for investment among the population: 
capital availability therein was restricted so that funds for business purposes and trade were 
cheaply accessible, but not obtainable for investments in buildings and agriculture. Through the 
highlighting of the unequal access to financial institutions, LEWIS already considered a specific 
form of economic exclusion. He concluded that the financial marginalization had wide-reaching 
and long-term impacts on a country’s prospect for economic development. An often cited 
phrase of LEWIS in this respect is that “the tendency for capital to flow evenly through the 
economy is very weak; in a backward economy it hardly exists. Inevitably what one gets are 
very heavily developed patches of the economy, surrounded by economic darkness”32. 
Central to the Lewis-model was also the inherent assumption of an ascending sectoral hierarchy 
of the traditional sector with respect to the economically growing industrialized sector. This 
sectoral hierarchy was also emphasized by BREMAN (1976a-b). The latter actually considered 
this very unequal interdependence between the two diverging sectors to be preconditional for 
development as it could be seen as an intra-system mechanism of resource reallocation: “The 
low rate of industrialization and the presence of surplus labour are listed as principal reasons 
why a dualistic system has sprung up in the cities of the third world. The informal sector 
contains the mass of the working poor whose productivity is much lower than in the modem 
urban sector from which most of them are excluded”.33  
Basically, the Lewis-model lay on three fundamental characteristics: i) dualism of systems, 
ii) unlimited supply of unskilled labor at the current wage, and iii) unskilled labor is paid more 
in the modern sector than in the traditional sector for the same quantity and quality of work. 
The first aspect was inspired by BOEKE and became more systematically described in LEWIS’ 
later works from 1968 and 1979. The other two conjectures became the fundamental 
                                              
32  Lewis, A. (1954), p. 409 
33  Breman, J. (1976a), p. 1871; he also provides a vague path towards a solution for the issue of exclusion through the gain 
 of access to formal schooling. Cf. Breman, J. (1976b), p. 1906 
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assumptions in the growth models of the 1950s and 1960s. By assuming an ‘unlimited supply of 
labor’, LEWIS separated both sectors not only in terms of productivity and but also in terms of 
their employment structures: “[the supply of labor is] so large relatively to capital and natural 
resources, that there are large sectors of the economy where the marginal productivity of labour 
is negligible, zero or even negative. [This applies also to the large sector of] the whole range of 
casual jobs – the workers on the docks, the young men who rush forward asking to carry your 
bag as you appear, the jobbing gardener, and the like. These occupations usually have a multiple 
of the number they need, each of them earning very small sums from occasional employment; 
frequently their number could be halved without reducing output in this sector.”34 In his 
revision of the Dual Economy (1979), LEWIS also highlighted the informal character of the 
traditional sector in LDDCs to which his model could be applied. In 1968, LEWIS published a 
paper where he sought to clarify and expand his previous works in several respects. With the 
expression ‘unlimited supply of labor’, the second fundamental model characteristic, he meant 
absolute elasticity of labor supply at the existing wage in the capitalist sector that continues to 
exceed the earnings in the agricultural sector – inciting continuous waves of migrants that leave 
for the urban areas.35 In later publications on the dual economy theory LEWIS (1968), (1979) 
abandoned the phrase “unlimited supply of labour” in favor of an “infinitely elastic supply of 
labour to the modern sector at the current wage” in order to avoid confusion and, as he often 
emphasized, “emotional distress”.36 
The third basic characteristic of the Lewis-model was the wage differential between the modern 
and the traditional sector. The wage level in the modern sector depends upon the earnings in 
the subsistence sector: the “minimum at which labour can be had is now set by the average 
product of the farmer; Men will not leave the family farm to seek employment if the wage is 
worth less than they would be able to consume if they remained at home.”37 Through the 
                                              
34  Lewis, A. (1954), p. 403 
35  Lewis also clarified that his model was never to be understood as an anti-socialist attack; although he considered 
 economic growth to arise out of industrialization, Lewis never explicitly outlined other systems than the capitalist 
 production. Moreover, in his model, he made no difference between private or public capitalists that hired agricultural 
 surplus labor for profit. Moreover, he strictly denied any disparagement of the peasant production vis-à-vis the capitalist 
 sector. It was just an assumption that in the initial stages the dynamism of growth was due to in capitalist expansion. 
 To Lewis, the agricultural sector only temporary served as a reservoir of labor (later complemented by immigration and 
 increased participation of women) and was by no means bound to a state of zero-growth: “The model does not deny 
 that peasants can grow rich by producing more, or more valuable output; it does not argue that capitalist production is 
 more valuable; it is not normative“! [Ibid. (1968), p. 2f] 
36  Ibid. (1979), p. 211 
37  Ibid. (1954), p. 409 
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reinvestment of the profits of industrial production within the modern sector, capital 
accumulation increases. The industrial sector expands and thereby drives rural-urban migration, 
attracting even more labor out of the traditional sector. Up to a certain extent agricultural 
output remains the same due to a negligible marginal productivity of labor. However, at some 
point, capital formation in the modern sector proceeds faster than surplus labor is set free and 
the population grows. Through the outflow of labor, the average product per man in the 
subsistence sector rises automatically. The ever fewer number of farmers have to support an 
ever greater number of industrial workers. The labor surplus diminishes and the expansion of 
the modern sector increases overall demand for food and thus prices of subsistence goods. 
Wages in the modern sector are driven up. LEWIS concluded that this was the reason why 
industrial and agrarian revolutions always arose together. To him, a stagnant agricultural sector 
was the crucial constraint to industrial expansion and thus economic growth.  
The interdependency structure between the traditional and the modern sector became also a 
central argument in HIRSCHMAN’s (1958) Strategy of Economic Development. He assumed the wage 
differential between both sectors to be a veritable growth advantage for the preindustrial sector. 
Joining the argumentation of LEWIS (1954, 1956, 1968), he reasoned that the preindustrial 
sectors in the LDDCs would be spared by the forces of industrialization for a longer time due 
to their labor-intensive and less capital-intensive structures. The far lower wage in the 
preindustrial sector thus represented a comparative advantage for the underdeveloped 
economies compared to the already industrialized sectors in the western countries. The lower 
labor costs would enable the independent (not to say informal) small-scale manufacturers and 
petty-commodity traders to dominate the market for specific products where the fix costs for 
advanced industrial methods would simply exceed the expected profits to a large extend. 
HIRSCHMAN therefore saw a huge dormant economic potential in the labor-intensive 
production methods of the informal sector e.g. the production of furniture, shoes, apparel, 
ceramics, baskets, basic metalworking, food-processing as well as house construction and local 
transportation. All these businesses would thus not only serve as employment buffer for the 
less skilled (obsolete) workers but would also generate economic growth through the increase 
in overall income. HIRSCHMAN’s argumentation in his early work on dualism was dominated by 
a transitory view of dualism and optimistic expectations with respect to its impact on long-run 
development: “[Dualism] has some compensating advantages and represents in a way an 
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attempt by the economy of an underdeveloped country to make the best out of its resources 
during a transitional phase”.38  
However, in his later works on collective action and institutions, HIRSCHMAN changed his 
argumentation on the role of the preindustrial sector and on dualism in general. Although he 
did not explicitly mention the term informal sector in his writings, the ‘later’ HIRSCHMAN 
(1974, 1978, 1981) considered economic dualism and the continuous presence of sectoral 
divergence to be the result of activist reactions to discontent with the prevailing institutional 
framework. Basically, HIRSCHMAN (1978) differentiated between two possible reactions an 
individual could choose from when faced with unfavorable organizations. The individual could 
either stay and maintain the relation with the organization while voicing his complaints and 
hoping for improvement; or the individual could exit and interrupt his interrelation with the 
respective organization because there was no hope for future improvement. This political 
framework of action could be used to explain the persistence of informal structures as a result 
of social and economic exclusion and the therefrom marginal status of specific population 
groups. The exit of individuals from the formal economy may thus be viewed as a decision 
motivated by despair and unsurmountable barriers to personal development. HIRSCHMAN 
(1981) also emphasized this point when he argued that exits occur in response to “the arbitrary 
and capricious actions of the sovereign”.39 While voicing one’s complaints may be a costly 
process in terms of time and money, the exit-option reveals to be less costly and easier to 
realize as the individual may rely on social ties within its kin to assure his survival in the 
institutional framework of the informal sector. With this argumentation Hirschman also sought 
to explain the ever growing unemployed labor force that accumulated in the urban areas.  
Only with HARRIS & TODARO (1968, 1970) the final differentiation between the various 
coalescing sectors was introduced: the rural agricultural sector and the rural urban sector where 
traditional technology prevailed in opposition to the equipment of the urban modern sector. 
They did not believe in the assumption of an agricultural labor surplus being responsible for the 
high unemployment rates in the urban areas and the ever-accelerating rural-urban migration 
                                              
38  Hirschman, A. (1958), p. 132 
 Lewis (1979) emphasized a similar line of reasoning. To him the expansion of informal small-scale activity in urban areas 
 was conducive for development because with its products and services it satisfied genuine needs and provided 
 employment for the migrants from the countryside. 
39  Hirschman, A. (1981), p. 257 
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waves. Instead, they assumed that the conventional wage and price adjustment in the labor 
market were annulled and could not counterbalance the magnetic attraction of the ‘bright 
lights’ of the cities onto the peasants. Contrary to the development models before, and based 
on their own empirical observations in Southeast Asia and Africa, they aimed at explaining the 
migration dynamics in LDDCs through the rural-urban differences in expected earnings. The 
urban wage level was assumed to have a dual function i.e. the determination of the industrial 
employment level and the allocation of labor resources between the traditional and the modern 
sector. Yet, the urban wage level was usually politically and not economically determined and 
thus represented an incentive for a continued rural-urban migration. Vis-à-vis the wage 
differential between the traditional and the modern sector, migration thus became an economic 
rational choice on the part of the job-seeking rural individuals. Therefore, all targeted subsidy-
policies for reducing urban unemployment and ‘back to the land’ programs such as the ones 
implemented in the 1960s in Kenya and Tanzania would be ineffective. They would probably 
prevent the effects of the urban minimum wage on unemployment but would of course not 
increase the level of industrial employment [HARRIS & TODARO (1968)].  
Similar to LEWIS’ argumentation, HARRIS & TODARO emphasized the inherent intersectoral 
connectedness through the migration of labor. There was a high elasticity of rural labor supply 
with respect to the creation of additional employment in the industrial sector i.e. every 
additional industrial job likely attracts more than one agricultural worker. Due to the limited 
absorption capacity of the industrial sector, the surplus migrants find themselves in a so-called 
urban traditional sector, the equivalent of the later concept of the informal sector. Especially 
TODARO (1969) stressed the role of the urban traditional sector with respect to rural-urban 
migration: Rural migrants behaved as absolutely rational maximizers of expected utility in terms 
of expected marginal urban real income. Although there was uncertainty whether the expected 
income would immediately exceed the present real rural income, migrants considered it to be 
still economically worth wile from a long-run perspective [i.e. “from a discounted present value 
approach to the rural-urban work choice”, TODARO (1969, p. 140)] to venture for the cities.  
Migration should thus be considered as a two-stage phenomenon. The informal sector builds 
the stage of arrival for the unskilled rural migrants and the modern sector represents the second 
stage where these migrants might eventually find a permanent job in the formal economy. If 
they fail, they remain on the first stage. Some may return to their rural home towns, others may 
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stay. For the latter the opportunity to work informally and gain the informal urban wage may 
still outweigh the opportunities awaiting them in their rural home areas.  
Instead of dividing the economy into two distinct formal and informal spheres such as HARRIS 
& TODARO, BREMAN (1976a) emphasized the “unity and totality of the productive system” as a 
continuum. He considered the unequal distribution of labor opportunities in a fragmented and 
mutually exclusive labor market to be the root cause for economic dualism and the division of 
the economy into a formal and an informal segment.40  
 
V. FROM THE INFORMAL SECTOR TO AN INFORMAL ECONOMY 
Being ‘informal’ basically refers to being not registered. Although not accounted for in the 
national statistics, there is substantial economic activity taking place in the informal sector thus 
also every day in those countries that are actually said to be underdeveloped. For roughly 45 
years now, the vivid variety of these non-registered activities had been simplistically referred to 
as ‘informal sector’. The advent of this catch-all term is commonly attributed to have originated 
in two independent publications, namely the work of Keith HART ({1971} 1973)41 and the so-
called Kenya-Report of the INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION (henceforth: ILO) from 
1972. At that time, the denomination ‘informal sector’ was not backed by a uniform definition 
but was solely based on the description of the complexity of the income and expenditure 
patterns and the urban economic structures in two Sub-Saharan LDDCs.  
In his analysis of the living conditions of the Frafra minority in Ghana, HART (1973) described 
the dual reality of the urban labor market of Accra. For several decades, the south-Ghanaian 
harbor city had been facing a continuous inflow of laborers migrating from the rural areas and 
seeking for employment in the capital. The absorptive capacities of the Accra labor market did 
not grow proportionally and thus the increasing surplus labor accumulated in the outskirt slums 
of the city. Remaining unabsorbed, these migrants sought for other, eventually informal, 
income-generating activities besides the formally accounted businesses. HART (1973) concluded 
                                              
40  Breman, J. (1976), pp. 1871-1874 
41 Contrary to the usual citations, the original article “Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in 
 Ghana” had been written by Keith Hart in 1971. The final publications of his article, however, only occurred in 1973: 
   i)  by Jolly, R. et al. (eds., 1973) in: Third World Employment: Problems and Strategy, Penguin, Harmondsworth;  
  ii)  in the Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 61-89, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK). 
 For simplicity, the final publication date “1973” will be used throughout the citations of Hart in this paper. 
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his article by emphasizing the two-sided character of the divergence between the formal and 
the informal structures and their universal presence throughout all LDDCs: “Accra is not 
unique, and a historical, cross-cultural comparison of urban economies in the development 
process must grant a place to the analysis of informal as well as formal structures. It is time that 
the language and approach of development economics took this into account”42. With his 
work, HART was the first author43  to establish a consensual analytical term – i.e. the informal 
sector – in order to unite all the uncountable appellations [such as subsistence, traditional, 
preindustrial or unorganized sector] that had been randomly used in the scientific discussions 
on the dualistic economic structures in LDDCs.  
Similar conclusions were drawn in the final report of the pilot country mission of the ILO 
World Employment Program in Kenya from 1971-1972: “For those who cannot make a living in 
the rural areas or fulfill their aspirations, there is the alternative of migrating to the towns. 
Particularly among the younger and the better-educated men […] there is a great influx to the 
towns, where both the formal and the informal sector of the economy offer income-earning 
opportunities.”44 The informality concept had enlarged the initially narrow notion of 
unemployment in the development literature through the integration of a huge variety of 
workforms beyond formal employment. The ILO concluded that the unemployment 
explanation often used in the literature and based upon the Lewis-model could not explain the 
persistence of the informal economic structures around the cities in LDDCs. Unemployment 
was often analyzed as direct result of a basic imbalance within the primary and secondary sector 
of an economy. In times of structural change there may be a discrepancy between a rapidly 
growing labor force and a more slowly growing number of job opportunities. If unemployment 
is too large and no safety nets are available to the job seekers to assure their subsistence living, 
there are two hypothetical opportunities for these people to choose: they could either return to 
their home regions and their kin or stay in the urban areas with an inherent danger of 
destitution. However, in reality, people do not only stay, but they also do not immediately 
starve. Instead, even more people migrate to the cities. These people find a subsistence living 
that is more attractive than a potential return to where they came from, where there is no 
                                              
42  Hart, K. (1973), p. 89 
43  Cf. Samal, K. (2008), pp. 22-25 
44  ILO (1972), p. 10 
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employment either. The informal sector absorbs all of these people and assures their survival – 
at least at a subsistence level. 
The introduced terminology of a ‘formal’ and an ‘informal’ sector sought to more adequately 
describe the sectoral duality in developing countries. Instead of insisting on the bias of the 
traditional-modern dichotomy, the authors of the ILO-report emphasized that “both sectors 
are modern; both are the consequence of the urbanization that has taken place in Kenya over 
the last 50 years. We might have used the terms ‘large-scale’ and ‘small-scale’, but those terms 
are purely descriptive and tell us nothing about why one sector is large-scale and the other is 
small-scale”45. 
The informal sector cannot be considered a transient phenomenon that arises as a form of 
petty-commodity production in the course of structural change. Instead, the informal sector 
represents a persistent phenomenon as it can be considered as market economy in its purest 
form where the quantities and prices of the goods exchanged are determined by their supply 
and demand without any distortionary state regulation. The magnitude of participation of the 
agents within the informal sector, however, is determined by their voluntary or involuntary 
choice of economic status and may be triggered by the economic exclusion of these individuals. 
The informal sector therefore represents a persistent attribute to all non-communitarian 
societies – be they capitalist, socialist, developed, transitioning or still struggling to industrialize. 
The introduction of the informal sector in the 1970s made it necessary to adapt the hitherto 
employed terms with respect to the issue. The usual dichotomy between the 
traditional/subsistence vs. modern/industrialized sector had thus to be abandoned in favor of a 
more adequate distinction between the formal and the informal sectors of an economy. Yet, 
even with a different terminology, still no straight demarcation line of affiliation could be drawn 
between both sectors and their agents’ occupations. The ILO-report (1972) highlighted that any 
differentiation between both sectors should be based on the “way of doing things”46; the report 
therefore enumerated several criteria of distinction based on a theory of ‘access’ and 
‘constrained opportunities’. Informal activities were thus characterized by an ease of entry, the 
reliance on indigenous resources; family ownership of businesses, the small-scale of operation, 
the absence of any formal support and legal regulation, high competitiveness of markets and 
                                              
45 ILO (1972), p. 503f 
46  ILO (1972), p. 6 
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the acquisition of skills outside the formal school system. In opposition to these aspects, 
activities and businesses in the formal sector were based on corporate ownership, large-scale 
and more capital-intensive operations, integration into international markets and reliance on 
resource and technology imports, protected markets and highly regulated activities through 
detailed legal frameworks and trade licenses, as well as formally acquired skills and knowledge. 
However, the most important attribute of formality per se was the difficulty of entry into that 
framework. As such, both, the formal economy and the informal sector were assumed to work 
entirely isolated from each other. In the 1970s, the informal sector was though regarded as a 
form of detached subsector being encapsulated within the formally accounted economy.  
Despite the long-lasting lack of a consistent statistical demarcation of what exactly the informal 
sector actually englobed, the issue of the growing sector of ‘urban informal employment’ had 
inspired numerous subsequent field studies in LDDCs aound the world [e.g i.a. (in 
chronological order) MAZUMDAR (1976), SETHURAMAN (1976, 1981, 1997), MOSER (1978), 
TEILHET-WALDORF ET AL. (1981), PEATTIE (1987), FEIGE & URBAN (1990, 2008), 
RAUCH (1991), TRIPP (1997), THORAT (2000), SCHNEIDER & ENSTE (2002, 2013), 
SCHNEIDER (2005) and AMARAL & QUINTIN (2006)]. The term ‘informal sector’ thereby 
constantly evolved through a continuous amplification of the scope of its initial denotation. 
However, the increasingly wide-spread motivation among economists to analyze the 
informal sector made it crucial to back the thitherto catch-all term with a harmonized 
statistical definition.  
Upon its 17th International Conference of Labour Statisticians in 2002, the ILO eventually 
adopted principal guidelines to enable the empirical grasp of the informal sector in its entirety 
with its various forms of employment and business activities. Thereby, the ‘informal sector’ 
definitorily evolved to an ‘informal economy’ that “refers to all economic activities by workers 
and economic units that are – in law or in practice – not covered or insufficiently covered by 
formal arrangements. Their activities are not included in the law, which means that they are 
operating outside the formal reach of the law; or they are not covered in practice, which means 
that – although they are operating within the formal reach of the law, the law is not applied or 
not enforced; or the law discourages compliance because it is inappropriate, burdensome, or 
imposes excessive costs”47. On the one hand, the newly adopted definition more adequately 
                                              
47  ILO (2014), p. 4 
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reflected the employment environment under which the urban and rural poor [i.e. those parts 
of a given population with the lowest incomes] earned a subsistence living in LDDCs.  
The definition now also allowed for the accountancy of the size and the dynamics of the 
informal economy in both, developing and industrialized countries based on internationally 
harmonized criteria.  
Broken down to its basic statutory characteristic, formality is based on the fact of being 
registered and being legally liable for any committed action. Through their status, agents in the 
formal sector therefore have a privileged access to social, legal and financial services. As already 
seen in the discussion of the works of BOEKE earlier in this paper, these privileges were often 
granted to the ruling elite of a developing country that quickly adapted and engaged with their 
resources in the new economic system [cf. also ACEMOGLU ET AL. (2005)]. This assumption of 
unequal access – be it historically given or an effect of post-colonial resource redistribution, is a 
fundamental issue of dualistic societies and thus central to every discussion on the formal and 
the informal sector. Already BOEKE (1953) and HIGGINS (1956) linked the concept of sectoral 
divergence to constraints on the availability of resources, and thus access to these very 
resources. In their Kenya-report, the ILO (1972) also highlighted the link between the 
economic situation of people and their possibilities of access to education, other social facilities 
as well as resources, and through that, also the close link to urban migration, the “frustration of 
unsuccessful job seekers” as well as the situation of the so-called (informal) working poor that 
“[work] very hard and strenuously, but their employment is not productive in the sense of 
earning them an income which is up to a modest minimum”.48 
Based on what had been illustrated until here, it becomes obvious that the issue of dualism, in 
its social and economic sense, was recurringly linked to the issue of accessibility of resources 
and the concreteness of individual opportunities in the sense of having the choice between 
different alternatives concerning one’s own future path of development. Therefore, there has 
always been a direct connection between the dualism of the formal and the informal economy 
and the exclusion of certain groups within society.  
 
                                              
48  ILO (1972), p. 9 
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VI. LINKING THEORY WITH THE OBVIOUS IN REALITY  
Excluded agents find themselves on the margins of society in various respects. Against the 
background of poverty and development, the concept of exclusion describes a process of 
amplification and reinforcement. To the best of the author’s knowledge, DE SOTO (1989, 2000) 
was the first to describe an explicit link between the marginalization of people and their 
(subsequent) engagement in the informal economy. The exact relation between informality and 
economic exclusion49 was never clearly defined throughout his works. Nonetheless, DE SOTO 
had no doubts that the consequences therefrom were conducive to keep the majority of the 
population in poor countries in an endemic state of poverty. He defined marginality as a lack of 
means to define, benefit from or enforce one’s claim to (economic) rights, and its cogent 
outcome being the desperate necessity to become extralegal in order to gain a living despite the 
economic status on the margins of society.50 
DE SOTO’s approach to poverty reduction was based on entitlement i.e. the procurement of 
titles to land and businesses to formalize people, make them accountable, officialize their 
collateral and thus, eventually tap their dormant economic potential. The fact of being 
extralegal entailed a specific crux; although most of the poor people already possess at least 
some assets (be it a dwelling, a piece of land, a shop with a specific customer base), they hold 
no formal title to these possessions thus they dispose of assets in defective51 form. In 
DE SOTO’s view this crux to development lay in inefficiently constituted legal systems that 
actually suppressed incentives for investment.  
                                              
49  Initially, the term was used to describe the social fragmentation and the dissolution of social connections between the 
 society as a whole and specific individuals, ethnicities or entire social classes. The term since then spread into the field of 
 development economics. It is commonly assumed that the authorship of the term ‘social exclusion’ appertains to French 
 politician Lenoir who, in 1974, wrote about the social exclusion encasing one tenth of the population in France: “To say 
 that a person is unfitting, marginal or unsocial simply corresponds to stating that, in an industrial and urbanized society at the end of the 
 20th century, this very person is incapable of satisfying her needs [..] or finds herself segregated – be it due to her own reason or be it the reason 
 of collectivity” (the author’s own translation). Cf. Lenoir, R. (1974), p. 10.     
50  De Soto, H. (2000), chapter 1 
51  De Soto regarded capital in the form of assets as a dead value that had to be reanimated and brought into a form that 
 could be used in economic transactions. The formal property system of the industrialized countries endows the asset 
 holder with socially recognized entitlements to use a resource (usus), to appropriate any returns from this use (usus 
 fructus), to change the form and substance of the resource (abusus) and to alienate these very rights to a third person 
 (ius abutendi) to benefit from the usus, the usus fructus, abusus and ius abutendi of his asset. For a more comprehensive 
 introduction to property rights theory, please refer to the discussions in Steiger, O. (2007).  
 Analogously to Demsetz’ (1967) explanations, De Soto’s development approach was though not about the disposition  
 of assets with specific technical characteristics, but about bundles of specific rights that were defined and backed 
 through a particular set of legal institutions and that determine the socially restricted use of commodities. 
 Cf. Demsetz, H. (1967), p. 347f 
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These systems failed to provide legally backed representations of assets in formal property 
documents. The latter would enable the respective asset holders to create additional value and 
maybe even increasing returns to their accumulated capital.52  
The aforementioned definition of marginality by DE SOTO was further developed by 
HANAGAN (2008) in his contribution to the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. 
VON BRAUN & GATZWEILER (2014) finally set up a definitory framework of marginality and 
exclusion to fill the semantic vacuum opened up by DE SOTO’s use of these terms. Marginality 
was thus defined as “the position of people on the edges, preventing their access to resources 
and opportunities, freedom of choices, and the development of personal capabilities”. The 
denomination of poor individuals to be socially or economically excluded from progresses in 
health, technology, infrastructure, business opportunities, or public services in any form 
indicates that these individuals are relegated to the margins of social and economic life. 
Exclusion thus inevitably leads to marginalization.  
VON BRAUN & GATZWEILER (2014) conclude that marginality is also a root cause of poverty 
because it describes the involuntary position of population groups at the margins of the 
political and economic system. The legal and geographical disablement of access to resources, 
public services and legal enforcement of the peoples’ rights necessarily cause an unequal 
distribution of opportunities. This description of dualism in access rejoins the aforementioned 
lines of reasoning of Boeke. Through the influence on the individuals’ disposable capability 
sets53, social and economic dualism have long term effects on the economic performance of 
society as a whole.54 HANAGAN (2008) emphasized the significant overlapping between 
different forms of exclusion as “groups that are excluded in one area tend to be also excluded 
in other areas”55. The same tenor was propounded by the World Bank (2003): “While different 
national discourses vary as to which aspect of exclusion – economic, social, and/or political – 
they emphasize, there is general consensus that the inability of individuals or social groups to 
                                              
52  De Soto, H. (2000), chapter 1 
53  The theory of the capability approach was developed by Amartya Sen [cf. i.a. Sen (1985, 1999)]. The approach is based 
 on the individual freedom to choose given the choice. The disposable variety of selectable alternatives arises out of 
 individually accessible assets, rights, knowledge and opportunities. Capability sets are thus determined within the formal 
 and informal institutional framework surrounding the individual within a society. 
54  Von Braun, J. & F. Gatzweiler (eds.) (2014), p. 3 
55  Hanagan, M. (2008), 1st paragraph 
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participate fully in the economy, in social life, and in political processes reduces social solidarity, 
augments social tensions, and holds back social development”.56  
 
VII. RECENT FINDINGS AND DIVERGING APPROACHES 
The dual development of societies with persisting dualistic institutional frameworks may 
explain why, in DE SOTO’s words ”people who have adapted every other Western invention, 
from the paper clip to the nuclear reactor, have not been able to produce sufficient capital to 
make their domestic capitalism work”57. As it has been elaborated throughout the preceding 
chapters, many theories have made their advent when it came to the explanation of the 
evolution and the persistence of the informal economy. In order to bring more structure into 
the multiplicity of overlapping and partly opposing approaches, CHEN (2012) grouped the 
different strands of theory on the emergence of the informal sector into four different schools.  
First, the Dualist School identifies only limited interconnections between the formal and the 
informal economy. Informal agents are regarded to be excluded from modern business 
perspectives and employment opportunities because of a discrepancy between the population 
growth rates and the increases in actual industrial employment as well as an incongruity 
between the skills supplied by the labor force and the abilities and know-how demanded and 
required by modern industries. Second, the Structuralist School views the informal engagement 
to be driven by the structural nature of capitalism and economic growth per se. In an attempt 
to circumvent labor costs and enhance competitiveness, formal firms optimize their economic 
situation by reallocating their labor force into informal employment. Third, the Legalist School, 
founded by the works of De Soto (1989, 2000), argues that those people engaged in informal 
activities try to circumvent a legal system that is perceived to be inappropriate by bypassing 
legal regulations with informal laws, rules and norms. The formal institutional framework is 
counterproductive to the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises and thus hampers 
incentives to accumulate capital. Fourth, the Voluntarists reason that the decision to work in the 
informal sector is taken deliberately after weighing the benefits, and especially the costs, of 
                                              
56  World Bank (2003), p. 18 
57   De Soto (2000), p. 7; this phrase also became the winged word of De Soto’s ‘Mystery of Capital’. 
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leaving the formal sphere or of not entering the formal economic system but of remaining in 
the shadow economy.   
When it comes to the interrelation of the informal economy with a country’s development 
process, the scientific opinions differ once more strongly on the issue. More recently 
LA PORTA & SHLEIFER (2014) summarized the different research strands into three different 
and in some points opposing schools of thought. These are concerned with the character of 
reciprocity and interrelation between the formal and informal economic structures. This 
categorization has been taken up and further expanded by the author of this paper and will be 
briefly described hereafter. 
The first category is represented by the legalist and property rights economists like DEMSETZ 
(1967) and DE SOTO (1989, 2000). Especially the latter focused on burdensome government 
regulations, unreliable legal protection and the lack of formal titles to property. These 
deficiencies spur disincentives to register businesses and to trust the perceived defective formal 
institutional framework. DE SOTO assumed that informal microbusinesses could potentially be 
as productive as formal businesses if only their untapped potential could be freed. For him, the 
crux lies in reforms to the property registries and the lowering of administrative barriers to the 
processes of business registration. With formal titles to their property, as little as the latter may 
be, the property holders would be able to obtain credit from the formal banking system and 
could thus invest in their businesses, accumulate capital and expand – thereby fueling and 
spreading economic growth. In DE SOTO’s approach the formalization of informal structures 
neutralizes the status of being on the margins of society. The exclusion of formal property titles 
impedes the access to credit funds, saving accounts and insurances and, thus, economically 
marginalizes the small entrepreneurs and drives them into the shadow economy. DE SOTO 
attributed these differences in access to institutional settings that favored the societal elites and 
disfavored the rest of the population. Recapitulating the history of Peru and the important 
legislative changes with respect to the Peruvian informal traders, DE SOTO (1989) concluded 
that the informal economy had to be considered to be both, traditional and institutionalized.58  
                                              
58  In his first book “The Other Path”, De Soto traced back the historical legislative evolution of informal trade in Peru. 
 After the first documented regulation of informal trade of street vendors in 1594, several other laws on the issue had 
 been passed in the subsequent decades and centuries. Depending on the respective predominant political tenor, there 
 had been alternating attempts to regulate, repress, formalize and even legally support informal street trade. 
 [Cf. De Soto (1989), pp. 75-79] 
  
 
 34 / 46  
The institutional disproportions in rights and access led to an extension of the informal sector 
because they limited the structural absorption of migrants venturing to the cities in search for 
wage jobs. The hence involuntarily excluded migrants had to rely on family connections and 
thereby entered an informal network of supply, processing tasks and trade which mainly takes 
place in domestic workshops and dwelling-shops. DE SOTO’s legalist approach can thus be 
considered to be rooted in the dual economy theories of the 1940s-1950s and the approach of 
HARRIS & TODARO of the 1970s. 
In opposition to the ‘legalist’ approach, the second category comprises those economists that 
highlight the aspect of illegality and the potential “parasitic” character of the informal sectors 
with respect to the formal economy [LA PORTA & SHLEIFER (2008), p. 109f]. In 2004, an 
influential study of the McKinsey Global Institute (henceforth: MGI) was published that 
pointed out the problems of the persistent informal sector in transitioning countries such as 
Turkey, Poland and the BRICs. Within these countries, the informal businesses and companies 
were and still are in direct competition with the formally registered businesses. For the last 
three decades all of these countries have attracted huge amounts of foreign direct investment in 
manufacturing. Vis-à-vis the continuous inflow of funds, the informal enterprises fostered and 
preserved their artificial competitive advantages that increased their productivity. Through the 
avoidance of taxes, social security contributions and the non-compliance with labor regulations 
these firms artificially lowered their overall cost burden: “MGI found that the substantial cost 
advantage that informal companies gain by avoiding taxes and regulations more than offsets 
their low productivity and small scale. Competition is therefore distorted because inefficient 
informal players stay in business and prevent more productive, formal companies from gaining 
market share” [FARREL (2004), p. 28].  
According to the MGI-study, the often praised short-term employment buffer function of the 
informal economy is altered to a long-term growth obstruction and welfare setback because the 
creation of new jobs within the formal sectors is hampered. Moreover, wages do not rise but 
are kept low – not to say bidden down – through the oversupply of cheap informal labor 
which, in addition to that, usually is not insured and not registered with social security. FARREL 
summarized two central economic consequences of informality. First, the prevalence of 
companies within the informal economy retains them from realizing economies of scale and 
gains in productivity. Second, the informal companies that evade taxation and labor legislation 
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are thereby enabled to steel market shares from their formal competitors that comply with the 
rules. However, FARREL failed to substantiate these findings with sound statistical evidence 
instead of anecdotal estimations for the countries in question.59 Another major default of the 
MGI study is that it blindly generalized results from the BRICs countries to the whole 
developing world.60 
One central fact that is not contested across the literature on informality is that the informal 
economies of industrialized, transitioning and LDDCs are very heterogeneous in their 
structure. The sectoral weights i.e. the focus of activities within the informal economy are 
different from country to country. The diversity ranges from subsistence survival, self-
employment and unpaid professional work to tax evasion, drug cartels, mafia networks, 
prostitution rings, and illegal gambling operations. Considering the criminal aspects of the 
informal economy, the second category of economists – who may be called ‘extralegalists’ – 
were in favor of suppressing informal businesses instead of condoning or even supporting their 
informal status. 
Besides the aforementioned Extralegalists, the third category consists of those authors who 
focus on structural dualism and market inefficiencies that lead to the advent of an unofficial 
shadow submarket within the formal market economy. Among these Institutional Dualists are 
HARRIS & TODARO (1970), LEWIS (1954, 1956), MAZUMDAR (1976), ROSENSTEIN-RODAN 
(1943) and ROSTOW (1960). They considered the traditional sector (i.e. the equivalent of the 
later termed informal sector) to be a transient and ephemeral attribute along the development 
path of an economy from the traditional handicraft economy to the industrialized mass 
production. Incentives to enter the informal economy are created through labor market 
restrictions for immigrants, trade barriers for merchants and, on the individual level, the gap 
between the total cost of labor and the net earnings after tax deduction i.e. the tax wedge which 
basically represent foregone earnings.  
Others within the group of the Institutional Dualists considered informality to be a natural side 
effect of poverty in times of structural change where the traditional sectors and the 
modernizing sectors of an economy diverge. BANERJEE & NEWMAN (1993) regard the process 
                                              
59  In Russia, the MGI-estimated disadvantage to supermarkets caused by price dumping of informal food retailers is about 
 13 % of the final good’s price. In Turkey, the cost savings of informal dairy processors is estimated at almost 20 percent 
 compared to their formal law compliant competitors. Cf. Farrell, D. (2004), p. 32 
60  Ibid., p. 32 
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of development as a path-dependent and self-enforcing dynamic process that depends on the 
initial distribution of wealth and the occupational choices taken thereafter. They built a model 
to illustrate the interplay between the initial distribution of wealth and market imperfections 
which determine the choice of occupation of the economic agents and the process of 
development of that very economy. Those classes of society among which certain resources are 
concentrated have more freedom to choose among different opportunities and may become 
employees, self-employed or remain unemployed. Moreover, market inefficiencies in the capital 
market lead to very unequal supply of funds to the various classes of society. Constraint in 
borrowing and sometimes even deprived from any financial services, poor people are unable to 
choose business occupations which require critical amounts of investment to be started or to 
be run. Instead of becoming entrepreneurs themselves, these people choose, or are forced to 
choose, to work as dependent employees with a wage rate that ensures the clearing of the labor 
market. “The pattern of occupational choice is therefore determined by the initial distribution 
of wealth, but the structure of occupational choice in turn determines how much people save 
and what risks they bear”.61 The occupational choices of the individuals depend on the initial 
distribution of wealth and the thereby facilitated or constrained possibilities of accessing credit. 
The model inherent capital-constraintness of individuals emphasizes the possibility of 
increasing returns to capital-access or, as Banerjee and Newman termed it, “pecuniary 
increasing returns”.62  
With the works of ROMER (1986, 1990, 1994) and LUCAS (1988) and the emergence of 
endogenous growth theory in the 1980s and 1990s, the focus was put on increasing returns to 
scale induced by technological progress. The development economists of these years, however, 
focused on market imperfections and the therefrom resulting constraints and unequal access to 
public services and financial market services. In their dynamic non-linear model of occupational 
choice, BANERJEE & NEWMAN (1993) endogenized the distribution of capital and assets within 
society in order to highlight the path-dependence of the labor market structure and subsequent 
overall economic development. There is either convergence to a high and wealthy steady-state 
or to a low equilibrium of low employment and low wages where parts of the population are 
excluded from the whole range of possible occupational choices.  
                                              
61  Banerjee, A. & A. Newman (1993), p. 276 
62  Ibid., p. 277 
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The previously mentioned Structuralists [LA PORTA & SHLEIFER (2008), LEVY (2008), 
ORDÓÑEZ (2010), SCHNEIDER (2012) and SCHNEIDER & ENSTE (2002)] focused on structural 
– not to say institutional – inefficiencies that are created through the absence of legal 
frameworks with respect to wage legislation and labor security. Overall, these economists agree 
that the dynamics of the informal economy are closely linked to the inability of governments to 
universally enforce their authority in terms of supervision of tax compliance and the payment 
of social security contributions. In the same sense, RAUCH (1991) focused on the effects of 
government’s ability to enforce wage laws where large firms were usually monitored but small 
firms were neglected. The latter were then able to pay less than the formal economy’s “wage 
floor”63 to their employees and to hire them on a day-to-day basis. Theoretically, the unequal 
enforcement of labor and wage regulations between larger (formal) firms and small (informal) 
businesses would lead to biased competitiveness and productivity, and thus, ostensibly, to 
biased market prices. Informal entrepreneurs are investment-constrained because they lack 
access to most public goods and financial market services; thus they diverge from formal 
entrepreneurs with respect to their production structures and have to rely on the use of low-
skilled human capital and low-quality inputs. For RAUCH informality, in some sense, is thus also 
an inevitable byproduct of poverty. As a direct consequence, the allocation of human and 
natural resources between the formal and the informal economy is determined through the 
ability to buy resources and to employ labor. The gap in productivity due to difference in the 
endowment of resources also causes the emergence of a price- and quality-determined dualism 
in labor forms and business sizes. 
However, LA PORTA & SHLEIFER (2008) reject the idea that simply registering informal firms 
would eliminate the gap in productivity between formal and informal firms. They argue that 
this very gap arises out of the divergence in the production structure. There is a genuine labor 
market dualism as the labor wages and goods prices informal firms deal with generally reflect 
the differences in productivity and technical sophistication. An imposed formalization through 
the subjection to legal enforcement would destroy the informal market economy and cause 
unemployment of millions of people that hardly achieve their subsistence-living.  
This last chapter on the various schools of thought dealing with the issue has shown that the 
concept of ‘informality’ has been evolving for the last 60 years. The contemporary employment 
                                              
63  Rauch, J. (1991), p. 34f 
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of the concept is that of an economic continuum where a distinct informal subeconomy is 
encapsulated within the formally accounted economy. At its advent, the concept of economic 
dualism described the coexistence of a traditional subsistence economy vis-à-vis a modern 
industrialized sector. The perception of the developing economy as a dual economy with one 
part being integrated into the world economy and another part remaining outside is considered 
to be the first examination of what is today known as the issue of the formal-informal sector 
continuum. BOEKE’s analysis of social dualism and his generalization of this coexistence to 
other LDDCs where western culture had penetrated eastern lands marked thus the beginning 
of the research of the informal economy. BOEKE (1953) regarded the issue of dualism in the 
developing world as almost unsurmountable and therefore as persistent attribute. However, his 
theoretical successors of dualism viewed it as a transitory phenomenon arising due to a 
different phasing of development. LEWIS (1954, 1956) and HARRIS & TODARO (1970) 
considered a growth framework where rural surplus labor flowed into the industrialized sector 
and expanded the theoretical production capacity. However, as these constant inflows were not 
met by respective increases in the availability of resources or resource productivity, economic 
growth lagged behind the structural changes. As a consequence, the practical production 
capacities were unable to absorb the agricultural surplus workers.  
The last decades of research in the developing world have shown that the economic dualism 
between the industrialized, i.e. formal, and the still traditional, i.e. informal, sectors in LDDCs 
did not disappear. At the high times of the informal sector theories in the 1970s, informality 
immediately became a controversially discussed issue in the ongoing conflict between the 
capitalist and communist blocs [Hart (1973)]. The socialists regarded the informal sector as the 
inevitable consequence of foreign capitalist dominance in post-colonial economies where the 
majority of the urban population was condemned to deprivation and exploitation. On the other 
side, the liberals regarded the informal sector to be a temporary buffer for 'bootstrap' 
operations that would lift the underdeveloped economies out of their misère through their own 
dynamic entrepreneurs. As always, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Although initially 
viewed as a natural transitory phenomenon, development research in the last 60 years revealed 
that the informal economy was indeed not a residue from a preindustrial phase of development 
but a permanent attribute especially of LDDCs where the majority of the population continues 
to earn their living in informal occupations. 
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In an attempt to describe the issue of economic parallelism, the terms formal and informal 
economy represent the denominators of two distinct economies, which are at different stages 
of development but coexist at the same time within a given country. These two economies are 
intertwined in a form of systemic continuum where the informal subeconomy is separately 
encapsulated within what is called the ‘formally accounted’ economy. This continuum of 
economies is based on the temporal overlapping of two divergent socio-economic settings 
within a specific region. Both systems, the formal and the informal economy, concur and 
overlap in certain sectors, but they are not congruent with respect to their underlying 
institutional systems.  
 
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In the aftermath of World War II, development policies of the capitalistic countries (as 
opposed to the Soviet bloc) were motivated by the successful recovery of western Europe and 
the continent’s, especially Germany’s, experience in socio-economic growth. At that time, 
the unsuccessful development programs of the World Bank and the IMF in the South 
America, Africa and Asia were motivated by the political containment and the belief in 
trickle-down effects of the implementation of liberal growth policies and the attraction of 
foreign direct investment. 
The present working paper attempted to make a clearing contribution with regard to the roots 
of the concept and the role of economic exclusion therein. Special emphasis has therefore been 
attributed to the assessment of the interrelations between economic exclusion and the naissance 
of the informal sector in the development economics literature. Institutionally determined 
marginalization of specific population groups – usually the poor who did not dispose of de 
facto political power – entails the latter’s deprivation of resources and opportunities. The 
economically excluded groups exit the formal framework of the modernizing industrial sector 
to gain their living in the informal sector. Informality and being an agent in the informal sector 
is a double-sided sword. On the one hand, the informal sector provides a free-to-access market 
economy where resources and labor are purely priced and exchanged with respect to supply 
and demand. All the transactions are only determined by the prevailing informal institutional 
setting. On the other hand, the therein prevailing incentive scheme tendentiously reinforces the 
prevailing dualistic reality of economic opportunities for the population. Based on the 
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explanations given in this paper, the author concludes that one necessary reason for the advent 
of the informal economy is the marginalization of social groups and their subsequent exclusion 
from formal economic activities. Moreover, there is a two-way causal relationship between the 
engagement in the informal economy and the fact of being marginalized and economically 
excluded. This causal reciprocity incites a self-enforcing cycle that leads to a status quo of 
informality and economic exclusion where the latter is partly voluntarily chosen and partly 
system-inherently forced upon certain social groups.  
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